The microeconomics of water demand under deficit irrigation: a case study in Southern Spain by Expósito García, Alfonso & Berbel Vecino, Julio
1 of 11 
 
The Microeconomics of Water Demand under Deficit Irrigation: A 
case study in southern Spain. 
 
Alfonso Expósito1 and Julio Berbel2 
1 Department of Economic Analysis, University of Seville, Spain; aexposito@us.es 
2 Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Cordoba, Spain; 
berbel@uco.es 
 
Abstract. 
 
This contribution presents an exploratory analysis of the 
microeconomics of deficit irrigation (DI) as a technique with 
growing prevalence in water scarce areas, as it is the case 
of southern Spain. We analyze farmer decisions based 
upon their subjective beliefs about water production 
function that farmers could attribute to this technology. The 
dynamic nature of water policy means that these 
technologies, which can be labelled as water saving 
techniques, have a relevant impact on the farmers’ decision 
process about the applied water doses and the structure of 
the water demand.  
 
1. Introduction 
This study attempts an exploratory analysis of the microeconomics of deficit 
irrigation (DI) that may significantly impact the economics of irrigation on its two 
fundamental variables, water use (applied irrigation dose) and price (elasticity to water 
cost). Molden et al (2010) argue that water productivity can be improved by practices 
including water harvesting, supplemental irrigation, deficit irrigation, precision irrigation 
techniques and soil-water conservation practices. Our research focuses on the 
technique of deficit irrigation as defined by consisting of the supply of irrigation water 
below the total irrigation requirements throughout the crop cycle (Molden et al., 2010). 
Regarding water dose used by farmers, a majority of the water models are based 
on the assumption that there is limited availability of irrigated land, but water supply is 
unlimited (i.e., it significantly exceeds crop needs). Accordingly, water is treated as a 
variable input and land as a constrained resource. In their model of deficit irrigation, 
Berbel and Mateos (2014) expanded the model developed by English (1990) to 
account for deficit irrigation. This model will serve us to analyze the behavior among 
our sample of farmers when they decide the water dose applied to their crops. 
On the price side, advocates of water pricing generally put forward three 
arguments (Perry, 2001). First, it serves as a cost recovery instrument for water 
services. Second, it provides an incentive for the efficient use of scarce water 
resources, and third, it acts as a source of finance to continue providing essential water 
services in the future (Kumar & Singh, 2001). Furthermore, water pricing is considered 
a suitable way of reflecting the economic and social value of the resource and of 
allocating it efficiently to different uses (Johansson, 2000), as well as a strategic tool 
for water and environmental policy as remarked in the Water Framework Directive 
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(European Commission, 2000) and the Blueprint to Safeguard Europe's Water 
Resources (European Commission, 2012). 
As described above, this paper aims to analyze the impact of DI schemes on the 
structure of water demand through the test of the following hypotheses. Firstly, farmers 
maximize returns for the water considering water volume as fixed and land as a 
variable input, instead of the conventional economic optimum of maximum returns for 
the land with water as the variable input and land as the limited factor. This behavior 
is consistent with the perception of the water resources in basins or in locations where 
water is considered the most important limiting factor for agricultural production as it is 
the case for many farmers around the world, especially for those with extensive crops 
in dry countries where the strategy is to maximize returns for the water, not land. And 
secondly, in areas where farmers adopt DI as a predominant strategy in response to 
water scarcity, the structure of the water demand function is also impacted in its 
elasticity with respect to price, leading to an ineffectiveness of water pricing at curtailing 
water demand, unless a disproportionate high threshold price is reached. 
In order to test the above-mentioned hypotheses, we surveyed farmers of irrigated 
intensive olive groves located in southern Spain in order to determine: (1) whether 
farmers have rational expectations regarding the water-yield relationship; (2) whether 
the decisions regarding the level of water use correspond to the maximization returns 
for water or, conversely, whether farmers behave as if they are maximizing returns for 
land; (3) whether threshold estimates, obtained through the elicited marginal product 
values of water, imply water pricing ineffectiveness. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 analyzes the impact of DI 
techniques on water-use decision making, followed by the study of the implications of 
this irrigation technique on the structure of water demand and water-price decision 
making in Section 3. The case study and results are presented in Section 4 and 5, 
respectively. Finally, main conclusions are summarized in Section 6. 
2. Implications of DI on water-use decision-making. 
Most of the decision-making models in agriculture are based on the use of 
objective data about economic and physical attributes (Anderson et al., 1977). 
Alternatively, Hardaker and Lien (2010) argue that decision-making analysis should 
explore the subjectivist view where the probability of an outcome is defined as the 
degree of belief in an uncertain proposition. This is in contrast to the dominant 
approach based on objective probability, which is defined as the limit of a relative 
frequency ratio (Anderson et al.,1977). 
This paper adopts the alternative approach for two reasons. Firstly, in the context 
under analysis there is a lack of robust, scientifically observed data. Secondly, we want 
to compare observed behavior regarding water use with the theoretical predictions 
produced by economic theory on the microeconomics of DI as explained in the seminal 
work of English (1990). 
Measuring the relationship between crop yield and used water is the most general 
approach to water management. It was initially developed by Doorenbos and Kassam 
(1979), while Steduto et al (2012) present an updated and comprehensive review of 
the coefficients that regulate crop response to water supply. Traditionally, a farmer 
determines the irrigation dose (W) taking into account the level of evapotranspiration 
(ET), the value of the effective rainfall and irrigation efficiency. Additionally, irrigation 
efficiency depends on the uniformity of application and the relative irrigation supply 
(RIS). RIS is a ratio of the applied supply of irrigation water compared to the maximum 
irrigation needs (Molden et al., 1998), in contrast to the relative water supply which 
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also includes rainfall. When irrigation tightly fills the gap of water requirements after 
they are met by rain, RIS is near unity. In the short term, the decision variable that can 
be managed is the irrigation dose. 
The value of water, and water demand, is a function of marginal productivity, which 
when multiplied by the product’s price yields the marginal value of water. The marginal 
productivity of relative irrigation water supply is the partial derivative of the production 
function Y(w) with respect to water “w”. 
A majority of the water use models are based on the assumption that there is 
limited availability of irrigated land, but water supply is unlimited (i.e., it significantly 
exceeds crop needs). Accordingly, water is treated as a variable input and land as a 
constrained resource. This assumption implies that farmers displaying rational 
economic behavior should maximize the following profit equation: 
CWPYPZ wy --=  (1) 
where Z denotes profit, Py is the price of the crop, Pw is the price of water, and C 
represents fixed costs. In their model of DI, Berbel and Mateos [13] expanded the 
model developed by English (1990) to account for deficit irrigation, efficiency changes 
and the situation in which land is not a binding constraint and water is a limiting factor. 
Thus, farmers who behave rationally in an economic sense seek to maximize total net 
income: 
( )CWPYPAAZ wy --×=×  (2) 
English and Raja (1996) illustrate this model with an example based on a quadratic 
water response production and cost functions, such as those represented below: 
Y(w) = a1 + b1W + c1W2 (3) 
C(w) = a2 + b2W (4) 
The solution to the optimization problem posed in Equation (1) takes land as the 
fixed input and water as the variable input. This is based on the conventional 
assumptions regarding farmer decision-making; that is, that they are seeking economic 
optima in the use of inputs such as water and others that are considered “freely variable 
inputs”. The solution to this optimization problem represents the maximum return to 
land and is determined by the value of water dose “Wl” given by: 𝑊" = 	𝑏& − 𝑃)𝑏*2	𝑃)𝑐*  (5) 
The solution to the second problem posed in Equation (2) considers water as a 
limited input while land becomes a freely variable input. This alternative model gives 
the maximum return to water (dose “Ww”): 𝑊- = 𝑃)𝑎* − 𝑎&𝑃)𝑐* */& (6) 
Finally, it is relevant to the microeconomic analysis of irrigation to determine the 
maximum yield solution. This straightforward solution is widely used to determine the 
maximum irrigation requirements; by solving Equation (1) the maximum yield is found 
at the point “Wm” represented by: 𝑊0 =	−𝑏*2	𝑐* (7) 
4 of 11 
 
The latter solution is relevant in terms of agronomic analysis, and it is equal to the 
economic optimum when the price of water is zero in the land-constrained model 
(Equation (1)). Regarding the parameters in the model, English (1990) included all 
variable costs linked to water application in Pw. Our simplified model focuses on water; 
therefore, we do not consider substitution relationships between irrigation water and 
other inputs but consider them as fixed. 
This research aims to compare the actual dose that a farmer applies to a crop with 
these three solutions to the optimization problem upon estimations obtained from a 
sample of olive groves farmers in southern Spain who extensively use DI techniques, 
as it is shown in Section 5. 
3. Impact of DI on water-price decision-making.  
The majority of water pricing related literature focuses on analyzing farmers’ 
responsiveness to pricing pressures and how price policies prompt the implementation 
of more efficient water use techniques. Nevertheless, there is a growing body of 
literature that concludes that irrigation water demand has a very low elasticity and 
water pricing is not particularly effective at curtailing water demand. As the price of 
water is only rarely determined by the market, the analysis of water demand for 
irrigation becomes problematic. Consequently, the value of water needs to be derived 
by modelling an optimization problem of farmers’ production function (Dinar & Letey 
1996; Rosegrant et al., 2001; Jeder et al., 2014). 
The studies of Bernardo and Whittlesey (1989), Ogg and Gollehon (1989), Dinar 
and Letey (1996) and Varela-Ortega et al. (1998) are good examples of attempts to 
model responsiveness to water pricing among farmers under restricted water supply 
(demand inelasticity). Nevertheless, it is still debatable whether or not water pricing is 
an effective measure in water demand management (De Fraiture & Perry 2007). 
Several studies claim that irrigation water demand is inelastic below a threshold price, 
and elastic beyond it (i.e. Perry 2001; Ray 2002). Thus, considerable price increases 
would be required to produce a reduction in demand, and such increases may involve 
important political considerations. 
In our case study, as it is the case in many parts of the world, farmers do not freely 
decide on the amount of water they will use to irrigate their crops, as water access is 
restricted by water rights (or fixed allocations). Under conditions of water scarcity and 
low water prices, the amount allocated is likely to be below the amount of water that 
farmers would be willing to take at the prevailing price, thus promoting the use of DI 
techniques. This would encourage the use of irrigation doses that would maximize 
returns to water, rather than returns to land as proposed by English (1990) and 
illustrated, among others, by Berbel and Mateos (2014). 
Figure 1 shows the relation between water price and demand under a fixed-
allocation system. At low prices, water demand is constrained by fixed supply (Ws) and 
farmers optimize water use by choosing an appropriate crop, level of risk and efficient 
irrigation techniques, thus showing no response to price. Conversely, water demand 
becomes elastic to price at a certain threshold price. This is the point where price 
equals the productive value of an additional unit of water (water price equals marginal 
product value of irrigation water). 
 
 
 
 
 
Water   
price 
(EUR/m3) 
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Figure 1. Water demand under restricted supply (WS) and deficit irrigation (WDI).  
Adapted from De Fraiture & Perry (2007) 
 
When DI techniques are extensively adopted, farmers’ irrigation decisions are 
shown to be seeking a maximum return to water, as found by Exposito and Berbel 
(2016). This is because water is considered the fixed factor in this case, instead of the 
more conventional hypothesis that maximizes return to land. Thus, under the 
predominance of DI schemes, the allocated amount of water would fall from WS to WDI 
(Figure 1), shifting the theoretical threshold price upwards, after which point demand 
begins to show negative elasticity to price.  
As Figure 1 illustrates, water pricing would be effective only if the price is set above 
a certain threshold, which would be much higher when DI techniques are extended in 
a context of restricted water supply, leading to significant reductions in farmers’ profits. 
Furthermore, the concept of a threshold price is relative, depending on several 
agronomic factors (i.e. type of crop and land) and irrigation technology (i.e. gravity, 
sprinkler, drip); it is therefore essential to examine the nature and scope of the price 
threshold in order to assess the potential effectiveness of water pricing in certain 
agronomic locations (De Fraiture & Perry 2007). We believe this point is especially 
significant in the case of highly efficient farmers (those who already use high-efficient 
irrigation techniques, such as drip in our case study) and with respect to how their 
irrigation-demand decisions are based on their subjective perceptions. 
 
4. Materials 
 
4.1. Case Study 
 
The case study selected to analyze farmers’ subjective beliefs about the water-
yield relationship is focused on irrigated olive groves in Andalusia (southern Spain). 
The area under study forms part of the Guadalquivir River Basin, which is the longest 
river in southern Spain with a 650 km length. The basin covers an area of 58,000 km2 
with a population of 4.1 million (the most populated cities are Seville, Cordoba and 
Granada). It has a Mediterranean climate with an uneven rainfall distribution (630 mm) 
and an average annual temperature of 16.8 °C. Annual renewable resources are 
estimated at 7.1 × 109 m3 for surface waters and 2.6 × 109 m3 for groundwater. In 2014, 
per capita water consumption in the basin was 1,600 m3, and agriculture was the top 
consumer with 87% of the total. Olive groves represent the main crop in the basin. 
Though initially famers simply installed drip irrigation systems into existing traditional 
 0                                WDI       WS                                   Water demand (m3/ha) 
Threshold 
price (WS) 
with restriction 
without restriction Threshold 
price (WDI) 
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groves (100 trees per hectare), new irrigation technologies have allowed farmers to 
significantly increase tree densities in order to create intensive groves (between 250 
and 300 trees per hectare) or superintensive groves (around 800 trees per hectare). 
4.2. Survey Description 
The field work was conducted in spring 2014 with information given by farmers of 
intensive olive groves in the Guadalquivir River Basin regarding yield and irrigation 
doses per ha, among other data, in the period 2010–2013. The original survey 
consisted of 99 observations (farmers), and average values in the survey are: (a) farm 
size: 40 ha; (b) density: 283 trees/ha; (c) allocation total water rights: 2,723 m3/ha 
(referred to as the legal water quota owned by the farmer); and (d) irrigation doses: 
1,028 m3/ha. We observe a discrepancy here, as water use represents 38% of water 
rights (irrigation dose/water rights = 1,028/2,723), which we consider an indication of 
the dominant DI strategy studied in our research. Potential evapotranspiration (PET) 
in the year of the survey was estimated at 492 mm for the intensive olives. 
The descriptive statistics of variables that characterize our survey (crop area, 
density, age of olive groves and assigned irrigation rights) are shown in Table 1. 
Although the variability within the sample seems high, the table shows that the 
observed farmers tend to apply an irrigation dose far smaller than that permitted 
according to their assigned water rights, displaying, on average, a preference for a 
scenario characterized by DI.  
Table 1. Basic descriptive parameters. 
 Area (ha) 
Density 
(trees/ha) 
Age 
(years) 
Irrigation 
Rights 
(m3/ha) 
Yield 
(kg/ha) 
Irrigation 
Dose (m3/ha) 
Average 40 283 15 2,723 6,382 1,028 
St. Dev. 64 80 6 1,846 2,344 388 
Minimum 1 208 4 200 333 200 
Maximum 400 571 30 7,000 13,833 2,500 
 
From our initial sample of 99 farmers, 51 were discarded as they presented 
estimation errors (i.e. increasing returns to scale) and/or missing information. 
Consequently, our sample was reduced to 48 valid behavioral observations.  
4.3. Perceived Water-Yield Response 
The water production function was elicited by asking farmers about their 
expectations regarding water volume and yield for three irrigation levels: full irrigation, 
usual DI and extreme DI. We assume that farmers will give rational answers and we 
need values that: 
• Identify the volume-yield for each of the three irrigation levels. 
• Exhibit decreasing returns to scale for the different irrigation levels. 
• Generate a water-yield curve in the “normal” agronomic range (maximum yield 
should be within the normal range for the crop and region). 
 
An individual subjective water demand function has been elicited on an individual 
subjective water-yield curve in the 'normal' agronomic range (maximum yield should 
be within the normal range for the crop and region) as defined in Section 2. The 
answers given by farmers regarding their expectations as to water consumption 
(m3/ha) and yield (k/ha) in three possible irrigation scenarios (extreme DI, usual DI and 
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full irrigation) make possible to estimate a quadratic production function (as defined by 
Equation 3). 
5. Results 
5.1. Water use decision-making. 
This paper aims to test the hypothesis that in the context of water scarcity, farmers 
maximize returns to water rather than the classical assumption that they aim for a 
maximum profit per hectare (when land is the limited input). In this regard, our study 
compares actual irrigation doses applied by farmers to a crop with the three optimal 
solutions to the profit maximizing problem as set out by English (1990) and described 
in Section 2. 
To do so, we estimate the values of optimal solutions, Wm, Wl and Ww, for each 
farmer of our survey sample. The descriptive parameters of the estimates in each 
individual microeconomic model are shown in Table 2, along with the values 
corresponding to the most frequently-used irrigation dose (usual DI) given by the 
surveyed farmers and the average real irrigation doses applied in the period 2010–
2013. 
Table 2. Solutions to the microeconomic model and observed behavior. 
 Analytical Solution Survey 
m3/ha Max. Yield (Wm) 
Max. Return to 
Land (Water 
Free) (Wl) 
Max. Return to 
Water (Land 
Free) (Ww) 
Usual DI  
(Wu) 
Avg. Dose 
2010–2013  
(Wo) 
Maximum 6,759 6,566 2,731 2,500 2,500 
Minimum 538 613 248 600 600 
Median 3,060 2,802 1,013 1,450 1,042 
Average 3,178 3,005 1,1631,2 1,3571 1,1032 
St. Dev. 1,391 1,298 571 425 350 
1At a 95% confidence interval, the t-test for the difference between means determines that 
Mean Wu=Mean Ww; 2At a 95% confidence interval, the t-test for the difference between means 
determines that Mean Wo=Mean Ww. 
As Table 2 shows, the solution for maximum returns for land (Wl), known as the 
traditional economic optimum, is very different from the average dose applied by 
farmers (Wo) and the usual DI dose (Wu). Furthermore, the average dose is close to 
the irrigation dose which maximizes returns for water when water is the limited 
resource (Ww). A simple t-test of significance between the mean values of the data 
distributions for Wo and Wu, and that obtained from the estimated distribution of 
variable Ww, show that peer data distributions Wo and Ww, as well as the peer Wu and 
Ww, have similar distributions with statistically equal mean values. As the confidence 
interval includes zero at a 95% significance level, we can affirm that there is no 
significant difference between the means of the two contrasting data distributions. This 
result would seem to indicate that our farmers display similar behavior (on average) to 
that corresponding to the maximization of the returns to water, thus moving away from 
maximizing production or achieving the economic optimum. 
Therefore, results obtained from the estimated microeconomic model would 
confirm that olive grove farmers tend to maximize returns to water, considering water 
volume as a fixed input and land as a variable input.  
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5.2. Water pricing decision-making. 
 
In order to test our second hypothesis regarding the impact of DI on water demand 
structure and its elasticity to price, individual elicited threshold price levels have been 
obtained. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of these elicited threshold levels given 
by the estimated marginal product value of water at the usual irrigation dose applied 
by each farmer, together with information regarding the current water cost. The 
average estimated marginal product value associated with the average applied water 
dose in our sample shows that the threshold price would be around 1.2 EUR/m3, which 
is 10 times the current average water cost paid by our sample of farmers (0.11 
EUR/m3). 
 
Table 3. Water cost and elicited threshold price. 
 
Water cost 
(EUR/m3) 
Applied 
 Water dose  
(m3/ha) 
Threshold Price 
(EUR/m3) 
Maximum 0.30 2,500 4.68 
Minimum 0.05 600 0.20 
Median 0.08 1,042 1.03 
Average 0.11 1,103 1.22 
St. Dev. 0.09 350 0.88 
Note: Average is the mean of all elicited individual parameters. 
 
As mentioned above, the threshold price is influenced by the technology choice 
adopted by the farmer and the existing water management practices in the river basin. 
These two factors usually lead to an evolution of the economic value of water 
characterized by an increase of the marginal product value of water. Further, when DI 
techniques are widely adopted, an increase of the threshold price also occurs. 
Consequently, the marginal product value of water and the threshold price determine 
the structure of water demand and evolve independently from water cost, which is 
related to supply evolution and water policy measures. Thus, in the irrigated olive case 
study, water cost would not be expected to play a key role in determining our farmers’ 
subjective water demand unless water price levels increase disproportionally and 
above the threshold price.  
The case of our sample’s median farmer is illustrated in Figure 2. In this case, the 
threshold price of water is estimated at 1.03 EUR/m3, which is far higher than the 
median cost of water in the basin (0.08 EUR/m3) and even well over our sample’s 
higher cost (0.30 EUR/m3). The grey shaded area represents the estimated economic 
rent associated with the resource and thus, with the farmer’s surplus obtained by the 
application of the DI technique. In this case, and assuming the highest observed cost 
of water in our sample (0.30 EUR/m3), the estimated economic rent would be 
equivalent to 1,099 EUR/ha. 
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Figure 2. Median farmer’s elicited water demand. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the water rent estimation, according to the definitions by Young 
and Loomis (2014). The figure shows marginal product value of water that is very close 
to those of Mesa-Jurado, Berbel and Orgaz (2010) who base their analysis for irrigated 
olives in an agronomic empirically derived water-yield response function, which is an 
alternative approach to our research that is based on subjective farmer beliefs. The 
similarity between our results based on farmer expectations and those based upon 
derivation of agronomic production function may be explained because farmers make 
their water volume decision considering scientific (agronomic field research) and 
administrative (the Basin Agency and Regional Government) information available and 
consequently, their personal experience may be reinforced by the knowledge from 
public domain explaining the convergence of farmer subjective expectations and public 
available agronomic functions. 
 
6. Concluding remarks. 
 
The past twenty years have seen substantial progress in the practical application 
of deficit irrigation for both annual and perennial crops (FAO, 2002). Most of the studies 
consider the agronomic technicalities of the optimal DI supply though the economic 
consequences have received scarce interest and the need for empirical tests is 
relevant.  
This study has presented preliminary results regarding the microeconomics 
implications of DI on water demand at farm level, but further research is required in 
order to account for other aspects such as uncertainty and farmer attitudes toward risk, 
which may explain some of the observed differences between farmer behavior and 
microeconomic analytical predictions.  
As we have pointed out, our research is focused on a specific area and crop (what 
clearly implies a limitation of this study) and it has demonstrated a general use of DI 
as a technique that allows the farmer to seek maximum returns to water and reduce 
price-elasticity of water demand till a disproportionate threshold price level (relative to 
current water costs). As a main conclusion, water pricing policy loses effectiveness in 
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areas characterized by water scarcity and supply restrictions (i.e. in over-exploited 
aquifers and basins), as is the case of the Guadalquivir river basin in southern Spain 
(and in many other parts of the world with similar climatic and hydrological conditions). 
In this regard, we believe that the extensive adoption of this technique will have serious 
consequences for the river basin management, requiring further research that is 
beyond the scope of our preliminary analysis. 
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